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PRODUCT MIX DEVELOPMENT: 
STRATEGY MAKING AT THE ENTERPRISE LEVEL 
J. Vecsenyi 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
This case study is presented with the aim of providing an insight into 
how a decision support system (DSS) was applied in two cases at a Hun- 
garian chemical works (CW) for formulating development and production 
strategies. 
R & D strategy-making is quite often based on the assessment of R & 
D proposals. In this case, these are new ideas and previous R & D results 
to be evaluated. Very rarely, it occurs that R & D strategy-making is 
based on assessment of actually manufactured products. Thls was, how- 
ever the case in strategy-making in the CW during the rounds discussed in 
this paper. Here, R & D strategy was formulated on the basis of analyzing 
the actual mix of products being fabricated (the product-mix), revealing 
the weak points and requirements for development of the individual 
p r ~ d u c t s  in the mix. The same analysis was also considered appropriate 
for showing what the preferred products should be when completing pro- 
duction plans. The procedure used did not focus on the assessment of 
alternative R & D projects as such, only their components, i .e . ,  prefer- 
ences between products for development and production. This, of course, 
does not mean that the assessment of the R & D projects themselves 
should be omitted from strategy making. However, the DSS applied here 
did not cover this area. 
The cases described here constitute two rounds in the overall stra- 
tegy making decision process at  CW. (A discussion of rounds and stages 
within rounds is given in Humphreys e t  al. 1982a.) The DSS used in each 
of the rounds was seen by both decision makers and consultants 
(analysts) as a procedure generating multi-attribute utilities of the 
product-mix (MAU-P) based on individual and group work, supported by 
computer programs. For describing DSS several definitions have been 
proposed. Here we follow the wider definitions given by Keen and 
Hackathorn (1979) and Humphreys e t  al. (1982b). 
These view the "system" as a whole including both people and 
automated support techniques, which can be developed dynamically, 
starting from a situation which is initially well structured. Repeated 
application is one of the  crucial factors in DSS development, as more 
information about structure is available in later applications, given 
appropriate analgsis of prevlous rounds in which the DSS has been 
applied. In the cases described here, there were two applications of DSS, 
the first in the first round, of strategy making, starting in 1979, and the  
second one in the next round, which started in 1981. 
11. THE PROBUM SITUATION 
Round 1 
At the time of the first round the situation of the enterprise (a  chem- 
ical works producing plastic articles, pesticides, intermediaries used in 
the pharmaceutical industry, and other organic and non-organic chemi- 
cals) was uncertain. The rate of development of the firm had decreased, 
it had economic troubles, the ministry wanted t c  reduce the autonomy of 
the CW by fu-sing it with a larger enterprise. But as a last chance new top 
managers were invited to help in solving the problem of the company by 
making a strategy for development. One of these decision makers 
responsible for the success and survival of the firm initiated the analysis 
of the problem by decision analytic tools. In a postgraduate course on 
management science a t  the Department of Industrial Engineering, Techn- 
ical University of Budapest, he had become familiar with multiattributive 
utility theory and its practical use. He believed that t h s  new method 
would be better than the traditional cost-effect, market position evalua- 
tion. 
The problem was defined at the outset of the round on the selection 
of the products to be developed, maintained or omitted from the product 
mix. Th s ,  however, was only part of the overall R and D policy making for 
CW, which was to determine the development and production strategy for 
the next one to  five years. The method of decision analysis as well as the 
supporting computer software were developed by a team of decision 
analysts (the consultants) from the Bureau for Systems Analysis of the 
Hungarian State Office for Technical Development, the Technical Univer- 
sity, Budapest and Management School, Ministry of Industries, Esztergom, 
Hungary. 
Round 2 
Two years later there was a second round in the process. The mode 
of initiation of the analysis, the definition of the problem and the method 
of use of DSS remained the same. However, at  that  time the situation of 
CW had improved. In the interim period between the rounds the firm has 
gradually started to develop, its economic stat.e had stabilized, and its 
independence had been assured. Consequently, the motivation of the 
participants in the round for DSS had changed. In Round 1, decision mak- 
ers perceived the use of DSS as one of the tools of survival but in Round 2 
DSS was perceived by decision makers only as a good help for re- 
evaluating the previous strategy based on the results of DSS in Round 1.  
The composition of the participants in the round also changed. In 
Round 1 representatives of state authorities and of related organizations 
(e.g., foreign trade companies, association of chemical enterprises, etc.) 
were also involved in the process of DSS. However, in Round 2, only inter- 
nal experts were involved. In Round 1 the involvement of external 
representatives was one of the ways of getting their benevolent support in 
helping the survival of the CW. They thus played the role of faciliiators in 
the decision making processes in this round. In Round 2 there was no 
need for such explicit participation of external facilitators. 
In the following sections we shall consider the stages in Round 1 in 
detail, and then give an  overview of Round 2. 
III. ROUND 1 
A. Responsibility and Motivation of Parties Involved 
The decision makers in the round (the board of top level managers) 
were responsible for the determination of company strategy. However, 
they knew that. they also had to "set an example" to decision makers at  a 
higher level (in the ministry) if the company was to survive as indepen- 
dent. At t h s  higher level, they acted as proposers, recommending their 
methods of analyzing the problems of the company as  the basis for their 
good strategic planning (as against the alternative of being fused as a 
component into some other strategic plan). Hence their motivation was 
quite complex, being oriented towards three goals: 
(i) rationalizing their decision by basing them on more reliable 
information; 
(ii) getting the collaboration of lower level managers in carrying out 
the strategy (they were new in their positions); 
(iii) having a tool for convincing higher level authorities (the minis- 
try) by "setting an  example" to them by solving the company's 
problems by using up-to-date tools (this served the decision 
makers in their proposer role). 
The experts involved in t h s  round were middle level managers and 
key figures in specific economic and technical fields. They were responsi- 
ble for providing reliable and detailed information about several, or all of 
the  products of the company on several or all of the attributes considered 
in the decision analysis, according to  their perceived expertise. In Round 
1, representatives of state authorities, foreign trade companies, and the 
association of chemical enterprises responsible for the affairs of the com- 
pany were also involved as e x t e r n a l  e x p e r t s .  But they were involved only 
at  stage 2 in the round (see below), when they were invited to assign 
weights to the attributes. 
The i n t e r n a l  e z p e r t s  were motivated by the possibility of 
(i) influencing the decision making process by using their informa- 
tion; 
(ii) explaining their views and preferences; 
(iii) convincing the new managers of their readiness for collabora- 
tion. 
The motivation of the experts was not homogeneous and explicit. The 
external experts collaborated willingly, (of 18 external experts invlted to 
participate in the attribute weighting procedure, 15 accepted the 
request). The challenge for the e x t e r n a l  e z p e r t s  was provided by the 
novelty of how their opinions were requested. Ths  was by a formal letter 
written by the director of the CW. The letter contained a questionnaire 
asking for their opinion on the importance of each main attribute 
expressed (i) by ranking all attributes, and (ii) by rating each main attri- 
bute on an interval scale ranging from 0 (no importance) t o  10 (extreme 
importance). For making their rankings and ratings they received guide- 
lines containing examples. 
The team of decision analysts, acting in this round as outside consul- 
tants were responsible for delivering methodological and managerial sup- 
port for the decision maklng process. Consultants were motivated by two 
goals: 
(i) developing and testing new methods for real life problem solving 
(ii) proving that the information of the managers and experts can 
be effectively used in an organized communication process corn- 
patible with DSS. 
B. The Function of the Expected Results 
The "function of the expected results" implied something different 
for everybody concerned with the decision making process in the round. 
Humphreys et  al. (1982a) gives a general discussion of active views of 
effects of DSS that participants map hold (see their Figures 1 and 2). In 
our case, the most important function of expected results perceived by 
the decision makers was to have an insight into the product mix on whch 
their strategy could be viewed. 
For the e q m t s ,  the most important effect expected from the appli- 
cation of DSS was the communication of information. For decision 
analys t s ,  the most important factor was the possibility for feedback 
about the appropriateness of their method. 
C. Stages in the Analysis 
The DSS used in the round was seen by both decision makers and 
consllltants (analysts) as a procedure generating multiattribute utilities 
of the product-mix (MAU-P) based on individual and group work, sup- 
ported by computer programs. Thls DSS supported the first four of the 
five stages outhned below. The five stages were: 
Stage 1: Exploration of attributes 
Stage 2: Weighting of attributes 
Stage 3: Ass'essment of alternative products 
Stage 4: Computation of multiattribute utilities of products in the 
mix 
Stage 5: Strategy making 
Stage 1 .  Ezploratinn of Attriautes 
Previously, the Hungarian State Office for Technical Development 
and the State' Planning Office had published a set of technical-economic 
criteria for evaluating product-mix and production structure (OT-OMFB 
1976). T h s  contained attributes appropriate for use in branch- level 
decisions. For this reason these sets of attributes needed to be adapted 
first for assessing products (rather than production structure) and 
secondly, for use in the actual CW application. 
In the first step of adaptation, a list of ten  main attributes and 56 
subattributes for evaluating products were initially compiled by post- 
graduate students in industrial engineering. In the second step,  this set  
of attributes was discussed and 'modified by 30 leading executives of CW 
resulting in a revised specification comprising 70 subattributes, while the 
main attributes remained unchanged (except for changes in interpreta- 
tion). 
When selecting attributes, we faced a problem frequently present in 
these cases, i.e., with how many attributes should we work? If several 
attributes are used, the picture will be differentiated but the aggregation 
will be more difficult. If only a. few attributes are used, the diversity of 
the evaluation is reduced, but the reliability of aggregation is increased 
or at  least appears to increase. The pitfalls revealed here have been 
reported in a previous paper (Vari and Vecsenyi 1982). 
In our case we adopted the following compromise: ten main attri- 
butes were selected, each being further differentiated with a set of subat- 
tributes to aid the interpretation of the main attribute. 
The 10 main attributes were: 
E l  - the "up-to-dateness" of the product 
E2 - the significance of the product 
E3 - the market and trade situation 
E4 - technical level of production 
E5 - dimension of the production 
E6 - raw material and energy supply 
E7 - man power requirements 
E8 - management needs 
E9 - necessity for development 
El0 - profitability 
Each main attribute was verbally interpreted and the relative subattri- 
butes were listed. As an  example, this listing is presented below for attri- 
bute E2. 
The significance of the product shows the importance of the 
given product for the manufacturing company rather than 
buyers and traders. 
The subattributes to be considered are 
E21 - ratio of the product production to total production 
E22 - role of the product on the context of the internal pro- 
duction 
E23 - ratio of the product production in home and interna- 
tional collaboration. 
We are aware that  two pitfalls have -to be avoided when setting up 
descriptions of main- and subattributes in this way 
(i) Having too many subattributes increases the uncertainty of 
characterization of the main attributes because we do not know 
which subattributes are influential. 
(ii) Too few subattributes may make their use superfluous since the 
characterization of main attribute on its own may form a suffi- 
cient basis for evaluation of products on it .  
In defining attributes, there may also be problems stemming from 
conflicts in means-ends relationships. 
For example, in the 10 attributes incorporated in the DSS, there is a 
mixing of means-ends and condition characteristics (e.g. up- to- dateness 
of the product (El) could be an  ends but also the means in achieving pro- 
fitability (ElO), wble the man- power requirement (E7) is an example of 
condition attribute). This problem is discussed further in Vari and 
Vecsenyi (1982). In "text-book" accounts of multi-criteria decision mak- 
ing attributes are generally generated from the objectives of the decision 
makers. Whlle it is known that it is often difficult to get an access to the 
decision makers' objectives and attributes, it is generally assumed that 
the attributes can always be deduced from the objectives. If it is not pos- 
sible to find more closer contact with top level decision makers, the usual 
ploy is to  suggest tha t  attempts should be made to  find out their 
objectives and attributes by different methods (e.g.  through constructing 
Rand's decision score cards as used in the Polano project, see Goeller 
1977). In our case the procedure actually employed was just the opposite 
of this, viz: 
(i) The consultants adopted the above-mentioned set of attributes 
and the inherent goal-system publ.ished and recommended by 
the central organs. 
(ii) Ths set of attributes was "translated into their own language" 
by more than 30 top and senior managers. 
(iii) The implicit and explicit objectives of the company were related 
to the set of attributes by decision makers. 
An example for of one of the forms of relating objectives to a particu- 
lar attribute is as follows: 
"According to the technical level of product ion the related com- 
pany objectives are those concerning the production of intensive 
technology with h g h  productivity and a great variety of conver- 
tibilities". 
Naturally, the compiled attributes were not view-ed as being equally 
important, and so the next stage involved taking into account the dif- 
ferential importance of attributes by determining relative weights. 
Stage 2. Weighting of Attributes 
In this stage CW managers determined company objectives and 
requirements related to criteria, so that attributes of products related to  
these criteria could be evaluated. In support of this, the c m l f  anfs (the 
analysts who designed the DSS) organized a training course for the 
participants on the methods of weighting attributes and assessments of 
the products and on the procedure of DSS.* 
Here, separate vectors of weights were elicited from all 78 partici- 
pants in t h s  stage in the round (five top level executives, 38 medium level 
executives, 20 internal and 15 external experts). The director of CW also 
asked 15 external experts a t  the "higher level" discussed earlier 
(members of the supervising committee and representative of their 
respective supervisory committee at  the ministry) to determine impor- 
tance weights for the principal criteria. (Recall that at  t h s  higher level 
the director acted as a proposer rather than as a decision maker.) 
The consultant analysts used clustering techniques to compute  
pooled vectors of weights of the participants in the round. The automatic 
clustering was based on a computer program which considered the 
degree of concordance between clusters of vectors of weights. Kendall's 
coefficient of concordance was used as the index in determining cluster- 
ing. Approximately ten "opinion groups" (middle level clusters) were 
identified through this clustering technique. The executives of the com- 
pany discussed the similarities and differences between the  results for 
the various opinion groups, and agreed that the model should be simu- 
lated using (separately) the vectors of weights from three groups: 
(i) top executives of the company (coefficient of concor- 
dance=58.9%) 
*This followed from the consultants' goels from the round, which were quite different from 
the motivations of the decision makers, viz: (1) developing and testing new methods for real 
life problem solving, (ii) pro-g that the information of the managers and experts can be ef- 
fectively used in an organized communication process compatible with DSS and (id) minimiz- 
ing the faults on the basis of previous experiences 
(ii) the opinion group of I4 decision makers clustered at  the inter- 
mediate level in the cluster analysis of weights vectors for al.1 78 
evaluators whose individual weights demonstrated the highest 
degree of concordance (92.8%), and 
(iii) the weights for the group of all 78 evaluators (concor- 
dance=59.9%). 
The results of ranking and rating of attributes, aggregated for each of the 
three groups are shown in Table 1. 
The value system of top managers (11 members) reflected by ranks 
and weights is, in t h s  sense, definitely more "forward-lookingw* than that  
revealed in the vector of weights averaged over all evaluators. This is 
Table 1. Ranks and weights of the attributes for each of the  groups 
chosen by CW executives as the basis for simulation. 
Group with the 
Groups Top managers hghes t  degree All 78 evaluators 
of concordance 
Attributes Ranks Weights Ranks Weights Ranks Weights 
E 1 3 6.64 4 6.00 4 5.72 
E 2 4 6.00 3 6.54 3 5.83 
E3 1 7.1 8 2 7.92 2 7.46 
E4 5 5.55 6 5.00 6 5.06 
E 5 6 4.55 B 3.23 8 4.13 
E 6 7 4.50 7 4.62 5 5.41 
E7 8 4.18 9 2.85 7 4.67 
E 8 10 0.73 10 1.38 10 2.01 
E 9 9 2.27 5 4.08 9 2.91 
E 10 2 7.09 1 9.08 1 8.09 
*Top managers often attempt to  achieve the satisfactory level on a particular criteria (level 
of profit, prduction, output, etc.) in many cases. Such managers can be characterized as 
"backward-looking"; they are quite conservative and do not take many risks. Jn the opposite 
case, there are top managers who have to produce results w'nich are liable to be risky but 
may however, also be indispensable for survival. These kinds of managers can be character 
ized for "forward-looking. 
shown by their preference of the market and trade situation (E3) as well 
as by that of the up-to-dateness of the product (El) .  This group can be 
called the market- oriented group. 
The group with the highest degree of concordance (14 members) 
consisted partly of top and middle managers and partly of external 
experts. It was striking in t h s  group that the necessity for development 
(E9) was considered more important than the other two groups. Since 
here profztabilify (E10) came first, we may call this group profit- oriented 
group. 
According to the value system of all participants (78 members), it 
can be agreed that,  here as well as in the previous group, profitability was 
ranked first. It can be assumed that, in t,hs case, too, as in the group 
with the hghest  degree of concordance, in the minds of the evaluators, 
this attribute is reflected as a common factor. Otherwise, the overall 
value system appears rather conservative. 
Ths  model as applied, was able to take the different opinions into 
consideration by evaluating products under each of the alternative 
weghtmg schemes. Consequently, there was no need to umfy the 
revealed divergence of opinions either by exercise of power or by seeking 
consensus. 
Stage 3. Assessment of the  Alternative A o d u c t s  
Assessment of 46 alternative CW products were made by the same 
internal 63 participants as in stage 2 (no external experts were involved), 
using a procedure taught to  them in a methodological training course 
arranged by the consultants that enabled them to express both valuation 
and uncertainty on the attributes identifjed in stage 1 in a format 
appropriate for input to stage 4. 
The evaluation of the p r o d u c t  rather than the p r o d u c t -  c l a s s  served 
as the basic unit in the evaluation of product-mixes and in the formation 
of company policy. Individual products could be adequately evaluated 
here because of the relatively small number of them in each of the four 
product classes. In all, 46 products were assigned for examination. This 
number did not comprise end products and packaging variants that had 
previously been represented in the product list of the company but that 
were currently withdrawn from production. 
The principle underlying the selection of e z p e r t s  was that  the pro- 
ducts should be evaluated by the set of people with the most information 
available about the product or the given attributes. CW managers also 
served in this role here.  Each expert was expected to provide only infor- 
mation concerning products or attributes in areas where he was com- 
petent. However, a significant demand for development of the methodol- 
ogy emerged from this. The problem of linking information resulting 
from the experts' individual sequences in the simulation model had to be 
solved. 
The evaluation on each product on each of the main attributes was 
carried out on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, by a method involving credi- 
ble interval estimation on the scale, with the simultaneous consideration 
of subattributes. Assigning a value of 10 on the scale meant tha t  the 
given product fully met the requirements represented by the attribute 
(and those subattributes grouped under it), while 0 showed that the 
product did not meet the requirements a t  all. Each evaluator gave credi- 
ble intervals expressed in terms of a center (most likely value) anc! lower 
and upper bounds. The uncertainty of the evaluator (characterizing his 
lack of information) was expressed by the length of the interval, while the 
center position in the interval was taken as his assessment of the pro- 
duct. In carrying out the procedure, the  first step for the evaluator in 
considering each attribute was to choose best product and to place i t  at  
10 ( i .e . ,  it defined the requirements to be met  by the other products). 
The assessment of the other products on the scale was then carried out 
relative to the best product. 
The examination of the products by the experts in this way was car- 
ried out over a period of one month. 
Stage 4 .  Computation of Mdtiattribute Utilities of Products in the M u  
Ths  was performed by the consultant analysts, using a multicriteria 
simulation model developed by Kiss et al. (Kiss 1978, Kiss and Torok 
1979), from a procedure proposed by Kahne (1975). The computations 
performed within the model resulted in three separate sets of rankings of 
the products evaluated in stage 3: one for each of the opinion groups 
whose attribute weighting vectors were assessed in stage 3. The consul- 
tants reported the assessment of each product in terms of how each of 
the three groups viewed i t ,  according to the simulation model. 
The computation was based on a multiattributed decision structure 
with judgments on individual attributes being represented by znteruaLs 
instead of fixed values. The length of the interval was proportional to  the 
uncertainty characterizing the opinion of the experts. The causes of 
uncertainty were 
(i) lack of information available to indi~ldual eva!uators concerning 
features of a product, and 
(ii) differences in opinion between members of the group (whch 
could be the consequence either of lack of information or of 
differing interests). 
Thus the numerical judgments input to the computation were in fact 
"subjective" experts' estimates, controlled by similar estimates of other 
experts. That is why there was no exogenous principle that would be 
appropriate t.o determine "right" opinion or the "right" value witbin each 
interval. Accordingly, each point of the interval was regarded as being 
possible, and we used a random number generator (from a uniform distri- 
bution over the interval) to determine the concrete values needed in the 
in&vidual steps of simulation. 
After hundreds or thousands of iterations such steps in the simula- 
tion, each product under investigation could be characterized by a distri- 
bution function referring to the place of the product occupied in the 
overall ranking of the products on each attribute. The uncertainty of the 
judgment was expressed by the characteristics of the distribution. The 
structure of the model allowed us to determine the expectation values 
and the variance of the  distribution characterizing each product on 
experts' mews concerning the attribute. 
The distributions on all attributes for each product were aggregated 
to give an overall distribution for the product. Ths  aggregation was per- 
formed three times, the sets of attribute weights for each of the three 
groups identified above. In this way the computations of the model 
resulted in rankings based on the opinion of three different experts' 
grou.ps (see Table 1) with each set of ranklngs accounting for the 10 main 
attributes simultaneously. Along with the position of the products in the 
three overall rankings the distribution for products on individual attri- 
butes produced by the computer program allowed us to discover the 
weak points of the products and to point out uncertainties and the differ- 
ences of opinions. As an  illustration, here is a report generated for a pro- 
duct on  the basis of the procedure described above: 
"The product is in the first third of the ranking, its rank order 
numbers acc~rd ing  to the weight of each of the three opinion 
groups are 10, 10, 11. According to the opinion of the group of 
top executives its profitability and up-to-dateness are very good, 
its market  position and necessity for development are weak and 
average, respectively. In judging profitability the other two 
groups are of the same opinion. The product is seen by the 
third group to be well above average as far as up-to-dateness is 
concerned. Each group is rather uncertain concerning the pro- 
fitability of the product, and the uncertainty expressed in the 
second group is greater than the average when judging the 
extent of necessity for development of production, man-power 
requirements and expressed uncertainty is greater than aver- 
age. In the third group when judging up-to-dateness and impor- 
tance." 
Stage 5. Stra tegy  Making 
T h s  stage was not covered by the DSS, as the decision makers did 
not wish the support of the analysts in this stage, and, on the other hand, 
analysts had no adequate method for strategy making in t h s  case. 
The problem defined a t  the start  of the round by CW's director as 
that to be addressed by the MAU-P DSS was complete at stage 4, but it 
provided simulation outputs, not strategic prescriptions. In t h s  sense 
the DSS supported p r o p o s a l s ,  rather than dec i s ions .  Vari and Vecsenyi 
(1982) discuss this as a pitfall of decisior, analysis: where the domain of 
the problem is greater than the domain of the decision analysis. In order 
to make decisions about the actual development strategies, additional 
criteria were used in t h s  stage by the decisions makers (e.g., those relat- 
ing to governmental programs, costs required for development, capacity 
constraints, etc.).  Excluding these from explicit consideration wi thn the 
MAU-P DSS meant that  only part  of the d e c i s i o n  m a k e r s '  values and 
preferences had to  be made explicit and subjected to formal analysis 
which implicit values could be taken into consideration intuitively by the 
decision makers in arriving a t  the actual decision which was taken in 
stage 5 .  
In hierarchical decision-making systems, a partial analysis of the  
problem like that carried out in stages 1 to 4 supports t.he m.otivation of 
the lower level decision makers to m e e t  the e x p e c t a t i o n s  of h i g h e r -  l eve l  
d e c i s i o n  m a k e r s .  
However, in ranking of the products and the characterization of the 
individual products provided by the DSS proved to be very useful for the 
company executives in f0rmin.g strategic decisions, although they did not 
t reat  this information as prescriptive. 
In the first step of strategic decision making, the production stra- 
tegy was determined. Taking into account information concerning the  
ranking of the products it was decided w h c h  products were to be 
i.ncluded or not into the production plan for the  next few years. The 
detailed analysis of the existing products provided through the  DSS 
prepared the  way for the formation of the company's development 
strategy. In particular, the uncovering of the weak points of the products 
in the reports generated from the results of the DSS indicated the main 
directions for product development. 
Consequently, the following development strategy was determined: 
(i) Development can be and must be realized within a short period 
in the pr-oduction. of pesticides, herbicides and their intermedi- 
aries. (The most important of the pesticides identified for 
development were in the first quarter of the ranking of the pro- 
ducts output from the DSS, while even the worst of them was 
placed in the middle of the rankings of 46 products, the kinds of 
intermediaries, identified as important for development were in 
the last third of the ranking. This fact can be accounted for by 
noting that  they were currently at  a pre-development stage.) 
(ii) Development of those plastic products occupying the first place 
in the ranking to be maintained a t  the current level. 
(iii) The production of any products currently produced in  small 
volume, which are represented in the last third of the ranking is 
to be stopped until 1983. 
This point, marking the end of the round, we reached six months 
af ter  its s tar t .  I t  is, however, only one part of the strategy. The other 
part  of the strategy concerns the evaluation of alternative R & D plans for 
those groups of projects identified above for further development. These 
are not considered in this report,  as  decision making in this report was 
not supported by the MAU-P DSS described here. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF IIdPLEMENTING A DSS IId ROLJND 1 
The results and methodological experiences acquired through the 
work carried out in Round 1 in implementing a DSS supporting decision 
making with the aim of modernizing CW's product-mix are as follows: 
The attributes identified in the literature on R & D policy making 
(OT-OMFB, 1978) were made easier to handle by the modifica- 
tions and the working out of the system of criteria to be incor- 
porated in the DSS. 
The way that the attributes were interpreted and discussed by 
the company executives and experts indicated that the consul- 
tants su.cceeded in their motivation to introduce modern 
approaches and methods of decision making into the company. 
Through developing and implementing a method for placing 
weights on criteria, i t  became possible to discover and describe 
their varying importance. In t h s  method, the views of external 
experts and the value system of persons with influence on the 
company could also be taken into account. 
A unified approach to the tasks involved in product evaluation 
and knowledge of the techniques involved was acheved through 
the incorporation of a methodological training course. 
The examination of the products and strategic decision making 
has been transformed from disjunctive activities into a collec- 
tive enterprise. 
A close linkage was established between executives and 
computer-based procedures in concrete (rather than purely for- 
mal) decision making activities. 
Through the use of the clustering techniques incorporated in the 
weighting procedure, together with the use of the simulation 
model in the preparation of the ranking of the products output 
by the DSS, information that was formerly obscured could be 
recognized (e.g., differences of similarities in value system of 
the different groups of evaluators, differing judgments of the 
products, and the uncertainties in experts' judgments, the weak 
points of the products). 
The systematic feedback of information concerning the results 
produced by the computer based techniques led to discussions 
and deeper analysis of key issues, thus offering new opportuni- 
ties to confront and clarify differences in opinion and to form a 
collective value system appropriate for the formulation of pol- 
icy. 
In exploiting the possibilities of collective work, a n  effective and 
fruitful interorganizational cooperation proved to be realizable. 
V. ROUND 2 
Nearly two years after the completion of the first round, CW's direc- 
tor requested the re-implementation of the DSS. Since stages and 
methods utilized in Round 2 were basically the same as those of Round 1. 
we will review here only the principal deviations and changes in the pro- 
cedures in Round 2, compared with those implemented in Round 1 
A. Responsibility and Motivation of Parties Involved 
The decision m a k e r s '  motivation changed somewhat between the two 
rounds. Their need for justification of their decision-making at  a higher 
level in the planning herarchy had now decreased as the company's 
achievements had improved, removing the necessity for such justifica- 
tion. In Round 2, the principal motivation of the decision m a k e r s  was now: 
(i) to test their previous strategy by using new information based 
on the changed environment and internal situation of CW; 
(ii) to make a new strategy taking into account the results of the 
DSS. 
The motivation of the ezperts within the company did not alter signi- 
ficantly. It was interesting to note, however, that those experts who did 
not respond to the request to participate in the first round now wished to 
be included in the second round. This indicates the significance of the 
DSS (and participation in it) in organizational life within the company. 
The director also realized the importance of participation of middle-level 
managers and experts. 'Rus resulted in the participation of no less than 
110 company executives and experts in Round 2. E z t m a l  experts were 
not, however, among these participants, for their good-will was won in the 
first round and so no requests were made for their participation in the 
second round. The consl~ltants  were motivated by the chance of being 
able to repeat the DSS m the same organization. and thus make improve- 
ments and comparisons. 
B. Stages in the  Analysis 
The sequence stages of the analysis in Round 2 did not alter from 
that of Round 1 but the outputs of the individual stages differed from 
those of the first round. 
Stage  1 .  Ezp lmat ion  of Attributes 
Due to the experiences of the previous analysis as well as to the 
changes in the environment, the set of attributes defined in Round 1 were 
revised by company executives and experts. 
Ths  revision left the main attributes unaltered, however, it altered 
about 30% of the subattributes, and this in turn altered the precise defini- 
tions of the main attributes. 
It is interesting to note that  decision makers did not attempt to 
modify the set of main attributes to be incorporated in the DSS, even 
though, in formulating strategy in stage 5 of Round 1, other attributes 
had been taken into consideration in describing aspects of products. It 
appears they wanted once again to avoid the explicit incorporation of 
these latter attributes into a DSS. 
Stage  2. Weighting of Attributes 
The method of computing weights for attributes was similar to that  
used in Round 1, but the number of participant in the procedure 
increased from 63 to 110. 
The value systems of the participants was revealed by the same clus- 
tering program employed in Round 1. Again. approximately 10 opinion 
groups were determined through the clustering procedure. After discuss- 
ing these groups, it was agreed that the DSS model should consider the 
weights of the following six groups: 
1. top managers (1 1 members) 
2. market-oriented group (14 members ranking market situation 
in the first place 
3.  significance-oriented group (12 members ranking the signifi- 
cance of the product in the first place) 
4, up-to-dateness-oriented gr0u.p (10 members) 
5 ,  profitability-oriented group (a significant number of the partici- 
pants, i.e., 41 members) 
6. all participants 
Groups 1 and 6 were defined a priori, the other four were selected 
opinion groups from the clustering procedure. 
Table 2 shows the ranks of attributes according to these six groups of 
partici.pants. 
Stage 3. Assessment of the Alternative Froducts 
There was a significant difference between the 1979 and 1981 produc- 
tion lists. In the meantime, the company had stopped manufacturing 
some items, and had initiated the development of some new products. 
The results of stage 5. Round 1, were partially responsible for these 
changes. While in the first round, 46 products had been considered alter- 
natives, in Round 2, only 41 were considered. 
Table 2. Ranking of attributes by the various groups 
TOP "Opinion groups" All 
Groups managers participants 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
At t r i bu t e s  
E 1 
E 2  
E3 
E4 
E5 
E 6 
E7 
EB 
E 9 
E 10 
S t a g e  4 .  C o m p u t a t i o n  of Mul t ia t t r ibute  Ut i l i t i es  o f  Produc t s  in t h e  M k  
According to the assessment the products were divided into three 
groups. Since a product could only be alloca.ted a maximum of 100, any 
product with a score above 60% could be regarded as outstanding. Those 
evaluated at  between 40 and 60% would be average, whle those under 40 
could be regarded as weak. 
On the basis of the ratings of the six "opinion groups" shown in Table 
2, products were classified into three categories, giving the results sum- 
marized in Table 3. 
Inspection of Table 3 reveals a slight tendency for the "significance- 
oriented" group (group 3) to rate relatively few products as outstanding, 
and to rate more products as weak. However, there is no significant 
difference in number of products rated as average across the groups. 
Naturally, assessing individual products, there were some deviations 
between the ratings assessed by the various opinion groups, but these 
Table 3. Assessment of products by the various groups 
Opinion groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of Outstanding 11 9 5 9 10 9 
products 
rated as: Average 19 2 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 
Total 
differences were never significant. There were no occurrences where one 
group regarded a produ-ct as outstanding, while another group rated it as 
weak. 
S t a g e  5. S t r a f  e g y  Mu.king 
In t h s  stage, as in Round 1, formal procedures were not irnple- 
mented to help decision makers in their strategy making activities. 
Instead, the output of the DSS implemented in this round (rankings of 
products) was used by CW's top managers to modify the strategy 
developed in stage 5 of Round 1. The precise nature of the other factor 
taken into account by their decision makers in revising CW's product mix 
development strategy is not known to  us. 
C. The Roles of the Parties Involved. Interfaces 
Decision makers played an active role in the whole procedure of DSS, 
but they refused to use any formal analysis in the strategy making stage 
in. both rounds. 
E x p e r t s  participated in adaptction and weighting of attributes and in 
the assessment of the products in terms of attributes. 
C o n s u l t a n t s  had another role in the procedure. They catalyzed and 
organized the process and the activity of decision makers. They explored 
the attributes, while the decision makers and experts adapted them. 
They organized a training course for the participants on the methods of 
weighting attributes and assessment of the products and on the pro- 
cedure of DSS. Consultants computed the weights of the attributes and 
the assessments of the products, whle the weighting and assessment 
were made by the decision makers and the experts. 
The c o m p u t e r  was used in stage 3 for computing group statistics on 
weights and identifying the value systems of the decision makers and 
experts. It was used in stage 4 for multiattribute aggregation of data 
relating to assessment of the products and in computing the measure of 
uncertainty of each aggregated assessment. The computer was used only 
by the consultants; only the r e s u l t s  of the computer based analysis were 
discussed with the decision makers and experts. The feedback and the 
discussion were part of the DSS procedure. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The use of DSS was successful because 
actual decision makers participated in the whole procedure; 
actual decision makers were interested in the result of DSS; 
actual decision makers were the clients; 
tools and methods producing easily accessible results were 
used; 
a training course helped the applicztion; 
previous knowledge possessed by experts could be utilized; 
in Round 1 approximately 70% and in Round 2, 90% of the 
managers participated (the h g h e r  the proportion who partici- 
pate, the greater the likelihood of a successful application). 
Effec t s  of Changes  Between Round 1 a n d  Round 2 
The change in decision makers' motivation for employing DSS was 
important for the consultants. In Round 1, the use of DSS was viewed by 
the decision makers as one of the tools of survival, but in Round 2, DSS 
was principally viewed as offering a good help for re-evaluating the 
product-mix R & D strategy developed in stage 5 of Round 1 using the 
results of the DSS implemented in Round 1. 
The role of the training also changed since the first application of 
DSS. Durlng the first round a 10-hour traming course helped the decision 
makers and experts to learn the methods of weighting attributes and 
assessing the products and the procedure of DSS. As part of this course, 
the attributes were weighted and the results of aggregation were dis- 
cussed. In Round 2 just four hours of training was found to be sufficient 
because the  majority of the participants in the round were now familiar 
with the methods and use of DSS. 
A change in the role of the consultants between Round 1 and Round 2 
was observed. In the second round the decision makers and most of the 
experts had interiorized the procedure and so interactions with consd- 
tants were requested less frequently. 
However, there was n o  change zr, t h e  pitfalls offered by the problem 
to be analyzed. As pointed out in our discussion of Round 1, there was 
still a difference between the actual decision problem and the problem 
proposed for analysis. 
In this case, the decision makers refused to use any formal analysis 
in strategy making in either rounds. However, the repeated use of DSS 
shows that,  in spite of the limited decision problem to be involved by the 
formal analysis, decision makers could profit by it. Given the motivation 
of the decision makers in their conduct of stage 5 in both rounds, it 
appears that  th.e DSS in this case met  the goals of the decision makers 
through being perceived as a p~oposul support system (PSS: hence the 
emphasis on its simulation capability) rather  than as a decision support 
system. Understanding the role of the DSS here as a PSS avoids pitfall for 
decision analysis discussed above, this may have provided the key to its 
success. 
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